IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/socarx/4xgfb_v1.html

Measuring Group Alignment in Public Opinion

Author

Listed:
  • Barari, Soubhik

    (NORC (National Opinion Research Center) at the University of Chicago)

Abstract

Issue polling typically reports group opinion one item at a time. However, democratic governance demands that groups act on agendas and form coalitions across multiple issues simultaneously. This paper introduces a non-parametric measurement framework for group alignment: the strength of a particular group's cumulative support across a basket of policy proposals. The framework yields several complementary metrics centered around cumulative alignment, each capturing a distinct facet of within-group opinion cohesion. Applying the framework to the Cooperative Election Study (2008-2024), I find that cross-issue alignment is remarkably low even in an era of sharp partisan sorting: while individual policy items command majority coalitions of 60–90% support among co-partisans, the share of cumulative majorities across every item in the core battery is nearly zero. Democrats exhibit modestly higher alignment than Republican, and Republicans experienced a decline in alignment during the first Trump presidency. Across racial, generational, and educational groups we similarly identify more- and less-aligned groups which are robust to alternative issue baskets and nonresponse assumptions. The framework offers researchers a transparent and interpretable method for summarizing intra-group opinion structure, tracking cohesion over time, and identifying the fault lines along which political coalitions may fracture.

Suggested Citation

  • Barari, Soubhik, 2026. "Measuring Group Alignment in Public Opinion," SocArXiv 4xgfb_v1, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:4xgfb_v1
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/4xgfb_v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/6a1d85e5432f822f6caada4b/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/4xgfb_v1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Huddy, Leonie & Mason, Lilliana & Aarøe, Lene, 2015. "Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement, Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(1), pages 1-17, February.
    2. Mehlhaff, Isaac D., 2024. "A Group-Based Approach to Measuring Polarization," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 118(3), pages 1518-1526, August.
    3. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Luigi Curini & Paolo Martelli, 2009. "Electoral Systems and Government Stability: A Simulation of 2006 Italian Policy Space," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 305-322, October.
    2. Weck-Hannemann, Hannelore, 1989. "Protectionism in direct democracy," Discussion Papers, Series II 79, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    3. Deniz Aksoy, 2010. "Who gets what, when, and how revisited: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget," European Union Politics, , vol. 11(2), pages 171-194, June.
    4. John R. Freeman & Jude C. Hays & Helmut Stix, 1999. "Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates," Working Papers 39, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    5. Drew Cagle & Nicholas T. Davis, 2024. "Civility norm violations and political accountability," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 105(3), pages 832-842, May.
    6. Beigman, Eyal, 2010. "Simple games with many effective voters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 15-22, January.
    7. Jeff Strnad, 2024. "Economic DAO Governance: A Contestable Control Approach," Papers 2403.16980, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2024.
    8. Mochon, Daniel & Schwartz, Janet, 2024. "The confrontation effect: When users engage more with ideology-inconsistent content online," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    9. Stutzer Alois & Frey Bruno S., 2006. "Making International Organizations More Democratic," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(3), pages 305-330, January.
    10. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur, 2016. "Formal versus informal legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 1-17.
    11. John Jackson, 2014. "Location, location, location: the Davis-Hinich model of electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 197-218, April.
    12. Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2008. "Rational benevolence in small committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 139-146, March.
    13. Scott H. Ainsworth, 1997. "Representation and Institutional Stability," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(2), pages 147-165, April.
    14. Alexa Bankert, 2022. "The Personality Origins of Positive and Negative Partisanship," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 10(4), pages 299-310.
    15. Kenneth Koford, 1982. "Centralized vote-trading," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 245-268, January.
    16. Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, 2007. "Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a Binary Policy Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 1958, CESifo.
    17. Haizhen Mou, 2012. "The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(4), pages 1640-1666, November.
    18. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
    19. Haoran Shi & Wanting Wang & Xin Ni Goh & Jorge Perez & Valeria Dibisceglia & Yi Hsuan Hsin & Pia Schmoeckel & Dario Krpan & Liam Delaney, 2024. "Predictors of partisan strength and in-party affect: a scoping review," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-20, December.
    20. Canegrati, Emanuele, 2006. "Yardstick competition: a spatial voting model approach," MPRA Paper 1017, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:socarx:4xgfb_v1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://arabixiv.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.