An Unusual Marriage of Deregulation and Populism: The Case of Regulatory Politics in Serbia

This article examines the transformation of Serbia’s regulatory state under the populist regime of Aleksandar Vučić (2012–2025), a period marked by democratic backsliding and heavy reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI). Focusing on competition policy and a subsidy programme for foreign investors, it shows how the regime has reshaped the regulatory state in ways distinct from other autocratic populist contexts. Core institutional carriers of the regulatory state have remained in place as non-majoritarian institutions and were even granted greater de jure insulation from government, yet in practice they have been undermined and their authority - along with that of other institutions in the wider regulatory ecosystem (law enforcement bodies, inspectorates, and others) - systematically suppressed. The result is an eroded, hybridised model of the regulatory state: the government has carved out a role for itself to decisively shape and direct sectoral policy, often in an arbitrary manner, with a distinct form of deregulation, namely through the outright non-enforcement of substantial regulatory standards.