IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oml/wpaper/201602.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Does Gender-Balancing the Board Reduce Firm Value?

Author

Listed:
  • B. Espen Eckbo

    (Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI))

  • Knut Nygaard

    (Oslo Business School, Oslo Akershus University College of Applied Sciences)

  • Karin S. Thorburn

    (Norwegian School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI))

Abstract

This research advances the hypothesis that female leaders (CEO, chair, and director) of a microfinance institution (MFI) give more priority to the poorest families in loan provision than male leaders. We differentiate between a depth and a width dimension of financial inclusion. The data set is a unique global panel of MFIs collected from MFI raters’ reports. Our sample is also unique in the sense that about one third of all MFIs have a female CEO. The problem of endogeneity for the female leader is resolved by running Heckman’s two-step endogenous dummy variable estimation with instrument for the female leader. We find evidence for greater depth financial inclusion (smaller average loan, more gender biased) with a female leader, but not for width financial inclusion (credit client growth). The female leaders exhibit greater altruism, greater competition avoidance, but not greater risk aversion than male peers.

Suggested Citation

  • B. Espen Eckbo & Knut Nygaard & Karin S. Thorburn, 2016. "Does Gender-Balancing the Board Reduce Firm Value?," Working Papers 201602, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:201602
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2766471
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vidhi Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Firm Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1789-1825, August.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & French, Kenneth R, 1992. " The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 427-465, June.
    3. Michael Greenstone & Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2006. "Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 399-460.
    4. Nygaard, Knut, 2011. "Forced board changes: Evidence from Norway," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 5/2011, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    5. Adams, Renée B. & Ferreira, Daniel, 2009. "Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 291-309, November.
    6. Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, 2012. "The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(1), pages 137-197.
    7. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    8. Cashman, George D. & Gillan, Stuart L. & Jun, Chulhee, 2012. "Going overboard? On busy directors and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3248-3259.
    9. Betsey Stevenson, 2010. "Beyond the Classroom: Using Title IX to Measure the Return to High School Sports," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 284-301, May.
    10. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. "Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(5), pages 1043-1075, October.
    11. Marianne Bertrand & Sandra E Black & Sissel Jensen & Adriana Lleras-Muney, 2019. "Breaking the Glass Ceiling? The Effect of Board Quotas on Female Labour Market Outcomes in Norway," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(1), pages 191-239.
    12. David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, 2013. "A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 136-169, July.
    13. Næs, Randi & Skjeltorp, Johannes & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2009. "What factors affect the Oslo Stock Exchange?," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/33, University of Stavanger.
    14. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1112, June.
    15. B. Espen Eckbo & David C. Smith, 1998. "The Conditional Performance of Insider Trades," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 467-498, April.
    16. Todd A. Gormley & David A. Matsa, 2014. "Common Errors: How to (and Not to) Control for Unobserved Heterogeneity," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(2), pages 617-661.
    17. Carhart, Mark M, 1997. " On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
    18. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    19. Jarrell, Gregg & Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "The Impact of Product Recalls on the Wealth of Sellers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 512-536, June.
    20. Thompson, Rex, 1985. "Conditioning the Return-Generating Process on Firm-Specific Events: A Discussion of Event Study Methods," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(02), pages 151-168, June.
    21. A. Craig MacKinlay, 1997. "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(1), pages 13-39, March.
    22. Field, Laura & Lowry, Michelle & Mkrtchyan, Anahit, 2013. "Are busy boards detrimental?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 63-82.
    23. Bøhren, Øyvind & Staubo, Siv, 2014. "Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board upheaval," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 152-168.
    24. Eckbo, B Espen & Maksimovic, Vojislav & Williams, Joseph, 1990. "Consistent Estimation of Cross-Sectional Models in Event Studies," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 343-365.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Garanina, Tatiana & Muravyev, Alexander, 2019. "The Gender Composition of Corporate Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 12357, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Ferreira, Daniel & Ginglinger, Edith & Laguna, Marie-Aude & Skalli, Yasmine, 2017. "Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching," CEPR Discussion Papers 12117, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Meier, Kristina & Niessen-Ruenzi, Alexandra & Ruenzi, Stefan, 2018. "The impact of role models on women's self-selection in competitive environments," Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181589, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Female leadership; Financial access; Microfinance institutions; Cross-country panel data;

    JEL classification:

    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:201602. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eirik Hanssen). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ohioano.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.