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Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulation Challenges

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  • Patrick Slovik

    (OECD)

Abstract

Bank regulation might have contributed to or even reinforced adverse systemic shocks that materialised during the financial crisis. Capital regulation based on risk-weighted assets encourages innovation designed to circumvent regulatory requirements and shifts banks’ focus away from their core economic functions. Tighter capital requirements based on risk-weighted assets may further contribute to these skewed incentives. The estimated macroeconomic costs of redirecting banks’ attention away from such unconventional business practices are low. During a medium-term adjustment period, for each percentage point of bank equity, regulation that is not based on risk-weighted assets would affect annual GDP growth by -0.02 percentage point more than under the risk-weighted assets framework. Refocusing banks’ attention toward their main economic functions is a core requirement for durable financial stability and sustainable economic growth. Banques d'importance systémique: défis pour la réglementation du capital La réglementation bancaire pourrait avoir contribué, voire renforcé, des chocs systémiques qui se sont matérialisés lors de la crise financière. La réglementation des fonds propres fondée sur des actifs pondérés par les risques encourage l'innovation conçue pour contourner les exigences réglementaires et éloigne les préoccupations des banques de leurs principales fonctions économiques. Le resserrement des exigences en capital fondées sur les actifs pondérés du risque peut exacerber ce biais d’incitation. Des estimations suggèrent que rediriger l’activité des banques hors de telles pratiques commerciales nonconventionnelles ne serait guère coûteux. Pendant une période d'ajustement de moyen terme, pour chaque point de pourcentage du ratio de capitaux propres bancaires, une réglementation qui ne s’appuie pas sur les actifs pondérés du risque réduirait la croissance annuelle du PIB de seulement 0,02 point de pourcentage de plus qu’une réglementation fondée sur les actifs pondérés par les risques. Un recentrage de l’attention des banques vers leurs principales fonctions économiques est une exigence fondamentale pour garantir la stabilité financière et une croissance économique durables.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Slovik, 2012. "Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulation Challenges," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 916, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:916-en
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg0ps8cq8q6-en
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    Cited by:

    1. Michal Skorepa & Jakub Seidler, 2015. "Capital buffers based on banks’ domestic systemic importance: selected issues," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 7(3), pages 207-220, August.
    2. Bjørnskov, Christian, 2016. "Economic freedom and economic crises," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 11-23.
    3. Paola Bongini & Laura Nieri, 2014. "Identifying and Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 43(1), pages 39-62, February.
    4. Elisa Fusco & Bernardo Maggi, 2016. "Bank Financial world crisis: Inefficiencies and Responsibilities," DSS Empirical Economics and Econometrics Working Papers Series 2016/2, Centre for Empirical Economics and Econometrics, Department of Statistics, "Sapienza" University of Rome.
    5. Abbate, Angela & Thaler, Dominik, 2015. "Monetary policy and the asset risk-taking channel," Discussion Papers 48/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    6. William R. White, 2014. "The Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions: Why Regulatory Responses to the Crisis Might Not Prove Sufficient," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1108, OECD Publishing.
    7. William R. White, 2012. "Ultra easy monetary policy and the law of unintended consequences," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 126, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    8. Mario Sarcinelli, 2012. "Come difendere la globalizzazione e salvaguardare i sistemi bancari dal contagio," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 65(257), pages 9-47.
    9. William R. White, 2012. "Credit Crises and the Shortcomings of Traditional Policy Responses," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 971, OECD Publishing.
    10. Figuet, Jean-Marc & Humblot, Thomas & Lahet, Delphine, 2015. "Cross-border banking claims on emerging countries: The Basel III Banking Reforms in a push and pull framework," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 294-310.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accord de Bâle; Bank Leverage; Basel accord; Basel III; Bâle III; capital requirements; crise financière; financial regulation; financial stability; institutions financières d'importance systémique; levier bancaire; réglementation financière; stabilité financière; systemically important financial institutions; Too-big-to-fail;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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    1. 系统重要性金融机构 in Wikipedia Chinese ne '')
    2. Systemically important financial institution in Wikipedia English ne '')

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