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The In Pari Delicto Defense for Auditors in Professional Negligence Cases: Imputation of Managers’ Unlawful Acts to the Client Firm

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  • Blythe Stephen E.

    (College of Business Administration, Abu Dhabi University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates)

Abstract

The Enron scandal, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 2008 financial crisis have resulted in new laws and regulations regarding auditor liability and an evolution of some of the old ones. One of the older laws is the in pari delicto defense: in a lawsuit brought by a corporation alleging that its auditor was negligent in failing to detect a manager’s fraud, the auditor may be able to use that defense if the manager’s fraud is imputable to the company. Since a bankruptcy trustee or a receiver steps into the shoes of the bankrupt company it represents, a similar defense (the Wagoner Rule) may also be applicable if a trustee or a receiver files a negligence lawsuit against the company’s auditor. However, in pari delicto is inapplicable when: (1) the wrongful acts of the manager are so adverse to the corporate client that the manager is deemed to have totally abandoned the corporation for its, or a third party’s, sole benefit (unless the manager is also the sole shareholder, or the company has incurred a short-term benefit because of the fraud); (2) the corporate client had at least one innocent manager or shareholder who could have prevented or stopped the fraud if he had known about it; (3) the auditor does not deal with the corporate client in good faith and engages in unlawful conduct; or (4) the plaintiffs are totally innocent shareholders (but in this case, the in pari delicto defense is still applicable with respect to culpable shareholders). The State of New York has been on the cutting edge in the evolution of the in pari delicto defense, and this defense is strongest there. Other states recognizing the defense include New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and (in dicta) Delaware (only if the company has engaged in actual wrongdoing). Finally, these are examples of recent evolution of in pari delicto: (a) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s prohibition of management from interfering with or deceiving the auditor; such statutory violations of management could be used by the auditor at trial in proving the applicability of the in pari delicto defense and (b) the new constraints on off-balance sheet leases, expected to be released shortly by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, may decrease management’s ability to deceive the auditor in the first place.

Suggested Citation

  • Blythe Stephen E., 2015. "The In Pari Delicto Defense for Auditors in Professional Negligence Cases: Imputation of Managers’ Unlawful Acts to the Client Firm," Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 193-226, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:aelcon:v:5:y:2015:i:2:p:193-226:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/ael-2013-0057
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Slovik, 2012. "Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulation Challenges," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 916, OECD Publishing.
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