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The Implicit Contract Model and Labor Markets: A Critique

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  • Aba Schwartz

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  • Aba Schwartz, 1982. "The Implicit Contract Model and Labor Markets: A Critique," Discussion Papers 513, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:513
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. H. M. Polemarchakis, 1979. "Implicit Contracts and Employment Theory," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(1), pages 97-108.
    2. Finn Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, 1980. "Time to Build and the Persistence of Unemployment," Discussion Papers 453, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Jerry R. Green & Charles M. Kahn, 1981. "Wage-Employment Contracts: Global Results," NBER Working Papers 0675, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Drazen, Allan, 1980. "Recent Developments in Macroeconomic Disequilibrium Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 283-306, March.
    5. Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-957, October.
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