Reference Prices and Bidder Heterogeneity in Secondary Market Online B2B Auctions
Online auction environments provide several sources of information that can be used by bidders to form their bids. One such information set that has been relatively understudied in the literature pertains to reference prices available to the bidder from other concurrent and comparable auctions. In this paper, we study how reference prices from such auctions affect bidding behavior on the focal auction. We also study how the impact of these reference prices is moderated by bidder heterogeneity. Bidders are shown to be influenced by two sets of references prices: internal reference prices from their own historical bidding behavior and external reference prices, formed from other open and just-finished auctions relative to the focal auction. We measure bidder heterogeneity using bidder experience and level of participation in concurrent auctions. Our results show that external reference prices are significantly moderated by bidder heterogeneity. In a departure from current work, we use longitudinal data on auctions and bids in the B2B secondary markets, where goods represent salvage or returned items from big-box retailers and bidders are business buyers. The dataset comprises over 4000 auctions collected from a large liquidator firm in North America and is unique in its comprehensiveness. Our work provides theoretical insights that are complementary to the current set of results from B2C auctions as well as managerial implications for auctioneers in the B2B space.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Adaval, Rashmi & Monroe, Kent B, 2002. " Automatic Construction and Use of Contextual Information for Product and Price Evaluations," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(4), pages 572-88, March.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002.
"Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, . "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Uri Simonsohn & Dan Ariely, 2008. "When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buyers: Evidence from Herding on eBay," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(9), pages 1624-1637, September.
- MINGLI ZHENG & Robert McMillan & SAJID ANWAR, 2005.
"Bidding Behavior in Competing Auctions: Evidence from eBay,"
- Anwar, Sajid & McMillan, Robert & Zheng, Mingli, 2006. "Bidding behavior in competing auctions: Evidence from eBay," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 307-322, February.
- Peters,M. & Severinov,S., 2001.
"Internet auctions with many traders,"
11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2001. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Working Papers peters-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Microeconomics.ca working papers peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 23 Jan 2006.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nicholas Economides)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.