Competition, Payer, and Hospital Quality
The objective of this study is to estimate the effects of competition for both Medicare and HMO patients on the quality decisions of hospitals in Southern California. We use discharge data from the State of California for the period 1989-1993. The outcome variables are the risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates for pneumonia (estimated by the authors) and acute myocardial infarction (reported by the state of California). Measures of competition are constructed for each hospital and payer type. The competition measures are formulated to mitigate the possibility of endogeneity bias. The study finds that increases in the degree of competition for HMO patients decrease risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates. Conversely, increases in competition for Medicare enrollees are associated with increases in risk-adjusted mortality rates for hospitals. In conjunction with previous research, the estimates indicate that increasing competition for HMO patients appears to reduce prices and save lives and hence appears to improve welfare. However, increases in competition for Medicare appear to reduce quality and may reduce welfare. Increasing competition has little net effect on hospital quality for our sample.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2002|
|Publication status:||published as Gowrisankaran, Gautam and Robert J. Town. “Competition, Payers and Hospital Quality.” Health Services Research 38 (2003): 1403 – 22.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- Gaynor, Martin & Vogt, William B., 2000.
"Antitrust and competition in health care markets,"
Handbook of Health Economics,
in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 27, pages 1405-1487
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- Gowrisankaran, Gautam & Town, Robert J., 1999. "Estimating the quality of care in hospitals using instrumental variables," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 747-767, December.
- Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1999. "Designing Hospital Antitrust Policy to Promote Social Welfare," NBER Working Papers 6897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Chernew, Michael & Gowrisankaran, Gautam & Fendrick, A. Mark, 2002. "Payer type and the returns to bypass surgery: evidence from hospital entry behavior," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 451-474, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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