Credit Markets and the Welfare Costs of Inflation
We construct a simple model in which high inflation imposes welfare costs because it affects the ability of the financial sector to screen between high and low cost producers. Consumers search for a low price and inflation reduces the incentives to search, resulting in an increase in the demand of high cost producers. We show that beyond a certain level of inflation there is a switch from a separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium, where financial institutions become unable to distinguish among clients. In this pooling equilibrium a larger share of credit is allocated to less efficient firms.
|Date of creation:||Oct 1994|
|Publication status:||Published as "Welfare Costs of Inflation, Seigniorage, and Financial Innovation", IMF, Vol. 38, no. 4 (1991): 675-704.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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