IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/4286.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Endogenous Growth and Cycles

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph E. Stiglitz

Abstract

Schumpeter argued that economic downturns had positive effects, in the incentives that it provided for firms to increase their efficiency. Part 1. provides a simple model confirming Schwnpeter's insight At thesame time, the model shows that there are real costs to economic fluctuations which extend well beyond the temporary losses in output and the economic waste resulting from unused resources: the future productivity of the economy is adversely affected, e.g, because of reduced expenditures on R&D. These long run losses are likely to be far more significant than any temporary gains from any induced cost cutting. While traditional Schumpeterian analyses have focused on the relationships between market structure and innovation, they have paid less attention to the relationship between innovation and capital market imperfections (resulting, in many cases, from problems of costly and imperfect information which are particularly important in the context of innovation). It is these capital market imperfections which give result in the deleterious effect of economic downturns on technological progress. Part II. of the paper shows that the nexus between fluctuations and innovation goes in both directions: fluctuations in economic activity not only cause fluctuations in innovation, fluctuations in innovation may give rise to fluctuations in economic activity. The positive feedback relationship between innovation and economic activity may, under a variety of conditions, give rise to multiple equilibria. There is no presumption that the free market, left to itself, will choose the best among them. Moreover, it is shown that under certain circumstances, the only market equilibrium entails economic fluctuations. It is the structure of the economy, not exogenous disturbances (as in real business cycle theory) which give rise to cyclical behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Endogenous Growth and Cycles," NBER Working Papers 4286, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4286
    Note: EFG
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4286.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    2. Bronwyn H. Hall, 1990. "The Impact of Corporate Restructuring on Industrial Research and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 85-135.
    3. Gans, Joshua S., 1989. "Knowledge of growth and the growth of knowledge," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 201-224.
    4. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1991. "Unemployment : A symptom of stagnation or a side-effect of growth?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 35(2-3), pages 535-541, April.
    5. Kenneth Button (ed.), 1989. "The Collected Essays of Harvey Leibenstein," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 282.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1990. "Financial Fragility and Economic Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 87-114.
    8. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 1994. "Growth and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 477-494.
    9. Sah, R.K. & Stiglitz, J.E., 1988. "Sources Of Technological Divergence Between Development And Less Development Economies," Papers 22, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
    10. H. J. Habakkuk, 1987. "The Historical Experience of the Basic Conditions of Economic Progress," International Economic Association Series, in: León H. Dupriez & Austin Robinson (ed.), Economic Progress, edition 0, chapter 5, pages 85-102, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    12. Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Examining Alternative Macroeconomic Theories," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 207-270.
    13. K. J. Arrow, 1971. "The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: F. H. Hahn (ed.), Readings in the Theory of Growth, chapter 11, pages 131-149, Palgrave Macmillan.
    14. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Pure Theory of Country Risk," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 391-435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Greenwald, Bruce C. & Kohn, Meir & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1990. "Financial market imperfections and productivity growth," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 321-345, June.
    16. Kenneth Button (ed.), 1989. "The Collected Essays of Harvey Leibenstein," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 281.
    17. Jaffee, Dwight & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1990. "Credit rationing," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 16, pages 837-888, Elsevier.
    18. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    19. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glen90-1, August.
    20. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Bruce Greenwald, 1992. "Towards a Reformulation of Monetary Theory: Competitive Banking," NBER Working Papers 4117, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Patrick Artus & Philippe Ducos & Francois Lecointe, 1992. "Rachats d'entreprise avec endettement (LBO et MBO) : motivations micro-économiques, effets sur l'efficacité des entreprises et risques macro-économiques," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 102(1), pages 89-104.
    3. Hellwig, Martin, 2000. "Corporate governance and the financing of investment for structural change," Papers 00-32, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    4. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank, 1999. "Corporate governance, ownership dispersion and efficiency: Empirical evidence from Austrian cooperative banking," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 119-140, June.
    5. Corinne Le Gallic, 1995. "Déréglementation financière, cycle et croissance," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 46(2), pages 255-281.
    6. Marcel Canoy & Machiel van Dijk & Jan Lemmen & Ruud de Mooij & Jürgen Weigand, 2001. "Competition and stability in banking," CPB Document 15.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    7. Jason Furman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1998. "Economic consequences of income inequality," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 221-263.
    8. Heinrich, Ralph P., 1999. "Complementarities in Corporate Governance - A Survey of the Literature with Special Emphasis on Japan," Kiel Working Papers 947, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    9. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Simons, T., 2005. "Public-to-Private Transactions : LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and IBOs," Other publications TiSEM 3b76799c-591c-4d22-b126-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Li, Bin & Yao, Yao & Shahab, Yasir & Li, Hai-Xia & Ntim, Collins G., 2020. "Parent-subsidiary dispersion and executive excess perks consumption," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    11. Young Mok Choi & Kunsu Park, 2019. "Foreign Ownership, Agency Costs, and Long-Term Firm Growth: Evidence from Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-17, March.
    12. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    13. Tåg, Joacim, 2010. "The Real Effects of Private Equity Buyouts," Working Paper Series 851, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    14. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    15. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Wulf, Julie, 2006. "Are perks purely managerial excess?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 1-33, January.
    16. Henrik Cronqvist & Fredrik Heyman & Mattias Nilsson & Helena Svaleryd & Jonas Vlachos, 2009. "Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 309-339, February.
    17. du Jardin, Philippe & Séverin, Eric, 2011. "Dividend policy," MPRA Paper 44382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Chia-Ying Chan & Iftekhar Hasan & Chih-Yung Lin, 2021. "Agency cost of CEO perquisites in bank loan contracts," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1221-1258, May.
    19. R. Glenn Hubbard, 1990. "Introduction to "Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment"," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 1-14, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Koke, Jens, 2002. "Determinants of acquisition and failure: evidence from corporate Germany," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 457-484, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4286. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.