A Theory of War Finance
This paper analyzes the financial and war-spending policies of a state that faces a war in which defeat would result in the loss of sovereign power and in which the material consequences, conditional on avoiding defeat, are stochastic. The analysis takes explicit account of the historical experiences of lenders, who face debt repudiation if the state to whom they have lent is defeated and who also face partial default if the material consequences of the war are unfavorable for the debtor state, even if it avoids defeat. In this analysis, the state uses war debt to smooth expected consumption intertemporally in response to temporary war spending, and the state also uses contingent debt servicing to insure realized consumption against the risk associated with the material consequences of the war.
|Date of creation:||Aug 1991|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Defence Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 33-44, (1993).|
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- Peter M. Garber, 1991.
"Alexander Hamilton's Market Based Debt Reduction Plan,"
NBER Working Papers
3597, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Garber, Peter M., 1991. "Alexander Hamilton's market-based debt reduction plan," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 79-104, January.
- Herschel I. Grossman, 1988. "The Political Economy of War Debts and Inflation," NBER Working Papers 2743, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Van Huyck, John B, 1988.
"Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1088-97, December.
- Herschel I. Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, 1985. "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," NBER Working Papers 1673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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