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Do Market Failures Create a ‘Durability Gap’ in the Circular Economy?

Author

Listed:
  • Don Fullerton
  • Shan He

Abstract

The interdisciplinary circular economy literature recommends longer lasting products, to reduce pollution from repeated production and disposal. For any type of appliance, we assume consumers choose among variants with different durability. Firms are competitive. Standard Pigovian analysis shows that optimal taxes depend on pollution and not on product life. Here, we find conditions where consumers choose lives that are too short – a “durability gap”. First, we show that suboptimal existing output taxes imply suboptimal durability. An increase in uniform tax on all variants encourages purchase of a more durable variant and raises welfare. Second, welfare also is raised by a subsidy for choosing a more durable variant or by a marginally binding durability mandate. Third, we find that a social discount rate less than the private rate is the strongest case for policy to favor durability. Fourth, the consumer misperceptions we study have ambiguous implications for durability policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Don Fullerton & Shan He, 2021. "Do Market Failures Create a ‘Durability Gap’ in the Circular Economy?," NBER Working Papers 29073, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29073
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    Cited by:

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    2. Grafström, Jonas, 2025. "Time as a Structural Barrier for a Circular Economy," Ratio Working Papers 387, The Ratio Institute.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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