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A Simple Test of Adverse Events and Strategic Timing Theories of Consumer Bankruptcy

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  • Li Gan
  • Tarun Sabarwal

Abstract

A test of adverse events and strategic timing theories can be conducted by determining whether some relevant financial decision variables, such as financial benefit from filing for bankruptcy, or debt discharged in bankruptcy are endogenous with the bankruptcy decision or not. For the strategic timing theory such decisions are endogenous, while for the adverse events theory they are not. Hausman tests for endogeneity show that financial benefit, unsecured debt, and non-exempt assets are exogenous with the bankruptcy decision, consistent with the adverse events theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Li Gan & Tarun Sabarwal, 2005. "A Simple Test of Adverse Events and Strategic Timing Theories of Consumer Bankruptcy," NBER Working Papers 11763, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11763
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mary Eschelbach Hansen, 2014. "Sources of Credit and the Extent of the Credit Market: A View from Bankruptcy Records, Mississippi 1929-1936," Working Papers 2014-09, American University, Department of Economics.
    2. Li Gan & Tarun Sabarwal & Shuoxun Zhang, 2010. "Personal Bankruptcy: Reconciling Adverse Events and Strategic Timing Hypotheses Using Heterogeneity in Filing Types," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 201008, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised May 2011.
    3. Benjamin J. Keys, 2010. "The credit market consequences of job displacement," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2010-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Adam B. Ashcraft & Astrid A. Dick & Donald P. Morgan, 2007. "The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: means-testing or mean spirited?," Staff Reports 279, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance

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