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Strategy-proof Choice under Monotonic Additive Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Bahel

    (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA)

  • Yves Sprumont

    (Université de Montréal and CIREQ)

Abstract

We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Bahel & Yves Sprumont, 2020. "Strategy-proof Choice under Monotonic Additive Preferences," Cahiers de recherche 16-2020, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    • Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:16-2020
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. , & ,, 2012. "Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    2. Michel Le Breton & Arunava Sen, 1999. "Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 605-628, May.
    3. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2005. "Voting by committees under constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 185-205, June.
    4. Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Pär Torstensson, 2008. "Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(2), pages 181-196, February.
    5. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    6. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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