Noisy commitments: The impact of information accuracy on efficiency
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More about this item
KeywordsCommitments; efficiency; experimental economics; information; trust;
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
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