The Optimal Size of Government
In the economic analysis of the theory of government, two views of government are evident. The Pigovian view sees government as a benevolent actor striving to correct for the inadequacies and excesses of an unrestrained marketplace. The 'Public Choice' view of government portrays government as the tool of special interest groups as likely to generate distortions as to correct them. In this paper, a model of government that incorporates both views will be developed and then empirically tested.
|Date of creation:||1987|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Public Choice, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1987), pp. 131-147|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Monash University, Victoria 3800, Australia|
Web page: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/
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|Order Information:|| Web: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/ Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sam Peltzman, 1980.
"The Growth of Government,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
1, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
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