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The Determinants Of Japanese Local‐Benefit Seeking

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  • STEVEN A. MEYER
  • SHIGETO NAKA

Abstract

This paper examines the determinants of the allocation of Japan's central government spending across its prefectures. Using the framework developed by Atlas et al. (American Economic Review, 85:3, June 1995, 624–629), the paper examines whether over‐represented Japanese prefectures receive larger real per capita transfers than under‐represented prefectures. A broad concern of the paper is whether institutions matter. Per capita representation of prefectures, party affiliation, and intra‐party characteristics are found to be determinants of Japan's central government transfers. The results suggest that institutions do matter. (JEL H3, H5, H6, H7)

Suggested Citation

  • Steven A. Meyer & Shigeto Naka, 1999. "The Determinants Of Japanese Local‐Benefit Seeking," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(1), pages 87-96, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:17:y:1999:i:1:p:87-96
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1999.tb00666.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Meyer, Steven A & Naka, Shigeto, 1998. "Legislative Influences in Japanese Budgetary Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 267-288, March.
    2. Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Working Papers 1, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    3. Steven Meyer & Shigeto Naka, 1998. "Legislative influences in Japanese budgetary politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 267-288, March.
    4. Peltzman, Sam, 1980. "The Growth of Government," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 209-287, October.
    5. Atlas, Cary M, et al, 1995. "Slicing the Federal Government Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 624-629, June.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    Cited by:

    1. Emilie Caldeira, 2012. "Does the System of Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers in Senegal Eliminate Politically Motivated Targeting?," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 21(2), pages 167-191, March.
    2. Debra Hevenstone & Ben Jann, 2016. "Fiscal Federalism and Tax Equalization: The potential for progressive local taxes," University of Bern Social Sciences Working Papers 19, University of Bern, Department of Social Sciences.
    3. Eiji Yamamura & Yoshiro Tsutsui & Fumio Ohtake, 2016. "Relative Income Position and Happiness: Are Cabinet Supporters Different from Others in Japan?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 383-402, December.
    4. Jameson Boex, 2003. "The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0311, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    5. Reingewertz, Yaniv, 2014. "Fiscal Decentralization - a Survey of the Empirical Literature," MPRA Paper 59889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Jameson Boex & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2005. "The Determinants of the Incidence of Intergovernmental Grants: A Survey of the International Experience (2005)," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0509, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    7. Fleck, Robert K., 2001. "Population, Land, Economic Conditions, and the Allocation of New Deal Spending," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 296-304, April.
    8. Kawaguchi, Daiji & Ohtake, Fumio & Tamada, Keiko, 2009. "The productivity of public capital: Evidence from Japan's 1994 electoral reform," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 332-343, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

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