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Die Konvergenz von externem und internem Rechnungswesen : kritische Faktoren für die Entwicklung einer partiell integrierten Rechnungslegung aus theoretischer Sicht

Author

Listed:
  • Simons, Dirk
  • Weißenberger, Barbara E.

Abstract

Seit den 1990er-Jahren lässt sich im deutschsprachigen Raum eine Konvergenz von externem und internem Rechnungswesen beobachten. In der Literatur wird ein integriertes Rechnungswesen vor dem Hintergrund der Steuerungsfunktion des Controllings jedoch äußerst kontrovers diskutiert. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die bestehenden Integrationsmuster, wobei nicht – wie in bisherigen Literaturbeiträgen – auf die Bedeutung einzelner Rechnungslegungsprinzipien abgestellt wird. Stattdessen wird die grundsätzliche Rolle der Rechnungslegung als Kommunikationsinstrument bei der Interaktion ökonomischer Akteure gewürdigt. Mithilfe eines evolutorisch-spieltheoretischen Modells können bedeutsame Charakteristika des Konvergenzbestrebens nachgezeichnet werden. So lässt sich bereits unter vergleichsweise schwachen Annahmen zeigen, dass sich eine IFRS basierte integrierte Rechnungslegung als evolutorisch stabiles Gleichgewicht gegenüber einer auf konservativen Prinzipien beruhenden separierten Rechnungslegung durchsetzt. Dieser Konvergenzdruck beschränkt sich in dezentral gesteuerten Unternehmensverbünden allerdings auf die Konzern- bzw. Segmentebene und schließt nicht notwendigerweise nachgelagerte Hierarchieebenen ein (partielle Integration). Damit kann die Hypothese gestützt werden, dass es sich bei den derzeit in der Unternehmenspraxis beobachteten Integrationsmustern nicht um einen ‘Modetrend’ handeln muss. Vielmehr liegt die Interpretation als Konsequenz einer rationalen Aktionswahl nahe.

Suggested Citation

  • Simons, Dirk & Weißenberger, Barbara E., 2007. "Die Konvergenz von externem und internem Rechnungswesen : kritische Faktoren für die Entwicklung einer partiell integrierten Rechnungslegung aus theoretischer Sicht," Papers 07-67, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2501
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    References listed on IDEAS

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