The Closed Primaries versus the Top-two Primary
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Jackson, Matthew O. & Mathevet, Laurent & Mattes, Kyle, 2007. "Nomination Processes and Policy Outcomes," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 67-92, March.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, "undated". "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Hummel, Patrick, 2013. "Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 85-102.
- Puy, M. Socorro & Martínez, Ricardo & Amorós, P., 2013. "The closed primaries versus the top-two primary," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1319, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Laurent Bouton, 2013.
"A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1248-1288, June.
- Laurent Bouton, 2012. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2012-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Laurent Bouton, 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/160854, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2015.
"Primaries: the unifying force,"
Springer, vol. 163(3), pages 289-305, June.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2010. "Primaries: The Unifying Force," Working Papers 496, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Rafael Hortala-Vallve & Hannes Mueller, 2010. "Primaries: The Unifying Force," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 843.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Mueller, Hannes, 2015. "Primaries: the unifying force," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 62019, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- César Martinelli, 2002.
"Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 901-919.
- Cesar Martinelli, 2000. "Simple Plurality versus Plurality Runoff with Privately Informed Voters," Working Papers 0004, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Hirano, Shigeo & Snyder, James M. & Ansolabehere, Stephen & Hansen, John Mark, 2010. "Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 5(2), pages 169-191, August.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti & Sabourian, Hamid & Winter, Eyal, 2009. "Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1278-1299, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
More about this item
KeywordsClosed primaries; Open primaries; Top-two primary; Citizen-candidate; Strategic Voting; Sequential voting. Condorcet consistency;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-12-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-12-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2014-12-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2014-12-24 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2014-12-24 (Positive Political Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2014-2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Samuel Danthine). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/dtmales.html .