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Top-Manager-Entlohnung, Arbeitsanreize und endogene Outside Options

Author

Listed:
  • Jens Robert Schöndube

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

Die Literatur über Corporate Governance und Top-Manager-Entlohnung (executive compensation) hat gezeigt, dass das klassische Prinzipal-Agenten-Modell die tatsächlich beobachteten Gehälter und Entlohnungsverträge für Top-Manager nur sehr eingeschränkt erklären kann. In jüngerer Zeit ist die Höhe der Entlohnung für Top- Manager in der Bundesrepublik stark diskutiert und zum Teil heftig kritisiert worden. Gerechtfertigt wird die Höhe der Gehälter fast ausschließlich über den Marktwert der Top-Manager. Der vorliegende Beitrag greift diese Diskussion auf und präsentiert ein Modell, in dem sich - abweichend von dem klassischen Agency-Problem - der gleichgewichtige Entlohnungsvertrag vollständig aus den alternativen Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten (Outside Options) des Managers ergibt. Wesentliches Element des Modells ist, dass ein Manager nicht mehr hinreichend motiviert ist, sofern er während seiner Beschäftigung feststellt, dass er den Wert seiner Outside Options nicht erreicht. Um sicherzustellen, dass der Manager über die gesamte Dauer der Beziehung motiviert arbeitet, muss der Entlohnungsvertrag so ausgestaltet sein, dass der Manager über den gesamten Zeitraum – insbesondere nach dem Zugang neuer Information – mindestens den Wert seiner Outside Option erzielt. Damit werden sowohl fixe als auch variable Komponenten der Entlohnungsfunktion vollständig aus seinem Marktwert abgeleitet. Wir vergleichen die resultierende Entlohnungsfunktion mit den Ergebnissen der Analyse klassischer Anreizprobleme.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Robert Schöndube, 2008. "Top-Manager-Entlohnung, Arbeitsanreize und endogene Outside Options," FEMM Working Papers 08024, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:08024
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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