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Iterative Reasoning in an Experimental "Lemons" Market

Author

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  • Annette Kirstein
  • Roland Kirstein

    () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)

Abstract

In this paper we experimentally test a theory of boundedly rational behavior in a "lemons" market. We analyze two different market designs, for which perfect rationality implies complete and partial market collapse, respectively. Our empirical observations deviate substantially from the predictions of rational choice theory: Even after 20 repetitions, the actual outcome is closer to efficiency than expected. We examine to which extent the theory of iterated reasoning contributes to the explanation of these observations. Perfectly rational behavior requires a player to perform an infinite number of iterative reasoning steps. Boundedly rational players, however, carry out only a limited number of such iterations. We have determined the iteration type of the players independently from their market behavior. A significant correlation exists between the iteration types and the observed price offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Annette Kirstein & Roland Kirstein, 2007. "Iterative Reasoning in an Experimental "Lemons" Market," FEMM Working Papers 07014, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:07014
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    File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2007_Dateien/2007_14.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2007
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Schotter Andrew & Weigelt Keith & Wilson Charles, 1994. "A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 445-468, May.
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    4. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P & Broseta, Bruno, 2001. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1193-1235, September.
    5. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    6. T. Randolph Beard & Richard O. Beil, 1994. "Do People Rely on the Self-Interested Maximization of Others? An Experimental Test," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(2), pages 252-262, February.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bounded rationality; market failure; adverse selection; regulatory failure; paternalistic regulation;

    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology

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