IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Maximal Decompositions of Cost Games into Specific and Joint Costs


  • Moreaux, Michel
  • Truchon, Michel


The problem in which some agents joint together to realize a set of projects and must decide how to share its cost may be seen as a cooperative cost game. In many instances, total cost may naturally be decomposed into joint costs and costs that are specific to individual agents. We show that the maximal amount that can be attributed directly to each agent while yielding a problem for the joint cost that remains a cost game, is given by the minimal incremental cost of adding this agent to any of the possible coalitions of other agents. Thus, for concave games, it is given by the incremental cost of adding the agent to all others. We also show that a concave game yields a reduced game that is itself concave. Le problème où plusieurs agents entreprennent en commun un ensemble de projets et doivent décider du partage du coût total peut être vu comme un jeu coopératif. Dans certains cas, le coût total peut naturellement être décomposé en coûts joints et coûts spécifiques aux agents. On montre que le montant maximal qui peut être attribué directement à chaque agent, tout en donnant un problème de partage de coût joint qui constitue encore un jeu de coût, est donné par le minimum des coûts incrémentaux de l'adjonction de l'agent aux coalitions possibles des autres agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Moreaux, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 2002. "Maximal Decompositions of Cost Games into Specific and Joint Costs," Cahiers de recherche 0205, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0205

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2001. "The Public-Private Sector Risk-Sharing in the French Insurance "Cat. Nat. System"""," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-60, CIRANO.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Cost game; Decomposition;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:laeccr:0205. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manuel Paradis). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.