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Illiquidity, insolvency, and banking regulation

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  • Cao, Jin

Abstract

This paper provides a compact framework for banking regulation analysis in the presence of uncertainty between systemic liquidity and solvency shocks. Extending the work by Cao & Illing (2009a, b), it is shown that systemic liquidity shortage arises endogenously as part of the inferior mixed strategy equilibrium. The paper compares dierent traditional regulatory policies which intend to fix the ineciencies, and argues that the co-existence of illiquidity and insolvency problems adds extra cost for banking regulation and makes some schemes that are optimal under pure illiquidity risks (such as liquidity regulation with lender of last resort policy) fail. The regulatory cost can be minimized by combining the advantages of several instruments.

Suggested Citation

  • Cao, Jin, 2010. "Illiquidity, insolvency, and banking regulation," Discussion Papers in Economics 11370, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenec:11370
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    File URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11370/1/Cao_2009.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Acharya, Viral V., 2009. "A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 224-255, September.
    2. Patrick Bolton & Tano Santos & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2011. "Outside and Inside Liquidity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(1), pages 259-321.
    3. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2008. "Cash-in-the-Market Pricing and Optimal Resolution of Bank Failures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(6), pages 2705-2742, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    liquidity risk; insolvency risk; liquidity regulation; equity requirement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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