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Beliefs and Trust: An Experiment

Author

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  • Jana Vyrastekova

    () (Departmment of Economics, Tilburg University, The Netherland)

  • Supriya Garikipati

    () (Management School, University of Liverpool, UK)

Abstract

In this paper, we address trust by combining (i) the self-reported trust and belief in trustworthiness of others from a general unpaid questionnaire, (ii) choices made in a social valuation task designed to measure subjects' distributional preferences, (iii) strategies submitted in a trust game in both roles of the game, and (iv) subjects' beliefs about the stategies of their co-player submitted in the form of probability distributions and incentivized by the quadratic scoring rule. We show that trust can be expressed as a belief in positive reciprocity by the trustee. Distributional preferences also play a role in the decision to trust in that they affect the subjects' beliefs about the positive reciprocity of others. Cooperative subjects are more optimistic in their beliefs and therefore they trust more.

Suggested Citation

  • Jana Vyrastekova & Supriya Garikipati, 2005. "Beliefs and Trust: An Experiment," Research Papers 200511, University of Liverpool Management School.
  • Handle: RePEc:liv:livedp:200511
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    File URL: http://www.liv.ac.uk/managementschool/research/working%20papers/wp200511.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Kamas, Linda & Preston, Anne, 2015. "Can social preferences explain gender differences in economic behavior?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 525-539.
    2. Pierre Koning & J. Vyrastekova & S. Onderstal, 2006. "Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study," CPB Discussion Paper 60, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Susana Martínez-Restrepo & Juan Camilo Mejía & Erika Enríquez, 2016. "Eliciting women's willingness to take a job. Evidence from displaced and extremely poor women in Cali, Colombia," COYUNTURA ECONÓMICA, FEDESARROLLO, vol. 46(1), pages 149-173, June.
    4. Kamas, Linda & Preston, Anne, 2012. "Distributive and reciprocal fairness: What can we learn from the heterogeneity of social preferences?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 538-553.
    5. De Marco Giuseppe & Immordino Giovanni, 2014. "Reciprocity in the Principal–Multiple Agent Model," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-38, January.
    6. Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2008. "Who Makes a Good Leader? Social Preferences and Leading-by-Example," Discussion Papers 2008-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Simon Gächter & Daniele Nosenzo & Elke Renner & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Who Makes A Good Leader? Cooperativeness, Optimism, And Leading-By-Example," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 953-967, October.
    8. Michael Naef & Jürgen Schupp, 2009. "Measuring Trust: Experiments and Surveys in Contrast and Combination," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 167, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    9. Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal & Pierre Koning, 2012. "Self-selection and the power of incentive schemes: an experimental study," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(32), pages 4211-4219, November.
    10. Susana Martínez-Restrepo & Juan Camilo Mejía & Erika Enríquez, 2018. "Eliciting women’s willingness to take a job: evidence from displaced and extremely poor women in Cali, Colombia," INFORMES DE INVESTIGACIÓN 016105, FEDESARROLLO.
    11. Fairley, Kim & Sanfey, Alan & Vyrastekova, Jana & Weitzel, Utz, 2012. "Social risk and ambiguity in the trust game," MPRA Paper 42302, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Experimental Economics; Trust; Beliefs; Distributional preferences;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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