Profitability of Horizontal Mergers in Trigger Strategy Game
Download full text from publisher
More about this item
KeywordsHorizontal mergers; Insiders’ dilemma; trigger strategy;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2006-03-05 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2006-03-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-FIN-2006-03-05 (Finance)
- NEP-IND-2006-03-05 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2006-03-05 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:06/4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mrs. Alexandra Mazzuoccolo). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deleiuk.html .
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .