The Effects of Corporate Finance on Firm Risk-taking and Performance: Theory and Evidence
Some firms may exhibit better operating performance than others because they undertake riskier projects: risk-return tradeoff. We develop a model to examine the effects of financial contracts on a firmfs choice between safer (lower risk, lower return) and riskier (higher risk, higher return) projects. The model shows that, assuming a competitive capital market (i.e., financiers with no monopoly power), three types of financial contracts (rollover loans, non-rollover loans, and new share issues) can each be an equilibrium contract, depending on conditions. While firms undertake griskierh projects when using non-rollover loans or new share issues, firms undertake gsaferh projects when using rollover loans. The model emphasizes the role of rollover loans (with passive monitoring) as a potential disciplinary device to suppress a firmfs risk-taking. The model generates several predictions about the determinants of a firmfs risk-taking and its performance. One key prediction of the model is that (risk-neutral) firms with closer bank relationships are more likely to use rollover loans and undertake gsaferh projects, even with a contestable capital market. We find novel empirical support for the modelfs predictions.
|Date of creation:||May 2009|
|Date of revision:||May 2009|
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- David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, 1998. "On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial System: Evidence from the Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 635-672, 04.
- Grinstein, Yaniv, 2006. "The disciplinary role of debt and equity contracts: Theory and tests," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 419-443, October.
- Kose John & Lubomir Litov & Bernard Yeung, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1679-1728, 08.
- Gorton, Gary & Kahn, James, 2000. "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(2), pages 331-64.
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