IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/jrp/jrpwrp/2010-091.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Does Entitlement Crowd Out Efficiency or Equality Seeking? - Selling the Roles in Generosity Game Experiments -

Author

Listed:
  • Agnes Bäker

    () (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)

  • Werner Güth

    () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group)

  • Kerstin Pull

    (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)

  • Manfred Stadler

    (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen)

Abstract

In generosity games, one agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the "pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiency or equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity game, participants are asked to buy their role via a random price mechanism. This should entitle them to exploit the chances which their role provides and at the same time avoid the selection bias of competitive auctions. We find that entitlement crowds out equality seeking and strengthens efficiency seeking. Interpreting participants' willingness to pay as an aspiration level of how much they want to earn, our design further allows us to test for satisficing behavior. Indeed, we find evidence for satisficing behavior in the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Agnes Bäker & Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2010. "Does Entitlement Crowd Out Efficiency or Equality Seeking? - Selling the Roles in Generosity Game Experiments -," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-091, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-091
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11238-013-9364-5
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2009. "Making the World a better Place: Experimental evidence from the generosity Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-071, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entitlement; Generosity Game; Efficiency Seeking; Inequity Aversion; Satisficing;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-091. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Markus Pasche). General contact details of provider: http://www.jenecon.de .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.