IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/jhu/papers/492.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Moral Sentiments and Social Choice: Fairness Considerations in University Admissions

Author

Listed:
  • Edi Karni
  • Zvi Safra

Abstract

We examine the implications for social choice of individuals having an intrinsic sense of fairness. Taking the viewpoint that social justice reflects the moral attitudes of the constituent members, we analyze the effect of the intensity of the individual sense of fairness on university admission policies. Assuming that these policies are determined by bargaining over test scores to be used as cut-off points for admission of members of diverse social groups show that, in general, a more intense sense of fairness of the members of a group leads to an admission policy that is more compatible with their idea of fairness. Consequently, a society whose members have a common notion tends to implement fairer admission policies when the intensity of the sense of fairness of individual memebrs increase. This is even if the policies are ultimately determined by the bargaining power of the different groups.

Suggested Citation

  • Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2003. "Moral Sentiments and Social Choice: Fairness Considerations in University Admissions," Economics Working Paper Archive 492, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:jhu:papers:492
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/REPEC/papers/WP492_karni.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Machina, Mark J, 2001. "Payoff Kinks in Preferences over Lotteries," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 207-260, November.
    2. Guillermina Jasso & Eva M. Meyersson Milgrom, 2006. "Distributive Justice and CEO Compensation," Discussion Papers 05-020, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61, pages 434-434.
    5. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
    6. Aumann, Robert J & Kurz, Mordecai, 1977. "Power and Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(5), pages 1137-1161, July.
    7. Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2002. "Individual Sense of Justice: A Utility Representation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 263-284, January.
    8. Colin F. Camerer, 1997. "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 167-188, Fall.
    9. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-1186, September.
    10. Edi Karni, 1996. "Social welfare functions and fairness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(4), pages 487-496.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Edi Karni & Zvi Safra, 2008. "Moral sentiments and social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 427-446, April.
    2. Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Ben Polak & Zvi Safra, 2010. "Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1939-1971, November.
    3. Abhinash Borah, 2021. "Individual sense of justice and Harsanyi’s impartial observer," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 167-199, July.
    4. Omer F. Baris, 2018. "Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(4), pages 547-556, June.
    5. Kolm, Serge-Christophe, 1998. "Chance and justice: Social policies and the Harsanyi-Vickrey-Rawls problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1393-1416, September.
    6. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    7. Lucy F. Ackert & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2004. "Tax policy design in the presence of social preferences: some experimental evidence," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    8. Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Ben Polak, 2003. "Accidents of Birth, Life Chances and the Impartial Observer," ISER Discussion Paper 0582, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    9. Songtao Wang & Bin Li & Tristan Kenderdine, 2019. "Towards a Utilitarian Social Welfare Function¡ªIncome Inequality and National Welfare Growth in China," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 10(3), pages 344-358, December.
    10. Yves Sprumont, 2013. "On relative egalitarianism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 1015-1032, April.
    11. Stefan Trautmann, 2010. "Individual fairness in Harsanyi’s utilitarianism: operationalizing all-inclusive utility," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 405-415, April.
    12. Marcus Pivato, 2009. "Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 79-92, January.
    13. Kato, Hironori & Matsumoto, Manabu, 2009. "Intra-household interaction in a nuclear family: A utility-maximizing approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 191-203, February.
    14. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 2002. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 459-541, Elsevier.
    15. Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Bargaining and Boldness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 28-51, January.
    16. Yew‐Kwang Ng, 1981. "Bentham or Nash? On the Acceptable Form of Social Welfare Functions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 57(3), pages 238-250, September.
    17. Hanany, Eran & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 254-276, February.
    18. Kotaro Suzumura, 2002. "Introduction to social choice and welfare," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 442, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    19. Michael Moehler, 2013. "Contractarian ethics and Harsanyi’s two justifications of utilitarianism," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 12(1), pages 24-47, February.
    20. Lucy F. Ackert & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2007. "Social Preferences And Tax Policy Design: Some Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 487-501, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jhu:papers:492. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Humphrey Muturi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dejhuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.