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How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country

Author

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  • Cigno, Alessandro

    (University of Florence)

Abstract

As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.

Suggested Citation

  • Cigno, Alessandro, 2011. "How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country," IZA Discussion Papers 5663, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5663
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Balestrino & Lisa Grazzini & Annalisa Luporini, 2017. "A normative justification of compulsory education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(2), pages 537-567, April.
    2. Meltem Dayıoğlu & Murat Güray Kırdar, 2022. "Keeping Kids in School and Out of Work: Compulsory Schooling and Child Labor in Turkey," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(4), pages 526-555.
    3. Alessandro Cigno, 2024. "Can a ban on child labour be self-enforcing, and would it be efficient?," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 37(3), pages 1-15, September.
    4. Jane Arnold Lincove & Adam Parker, 2016. "The influence of conditional cash transfers on eligible children and their siblings," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(4), pages 352-373, August.
    5. Cellarier, Laurent L., 2021. "Is landownership a ladder out of poverty?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal taxation; moral hazard; uncertainty; education; child labour;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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