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Factor Shares, Redistribution and Growth in a Captured Democracy

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  • Vindigni, Andrea

    (University of Genova)

Abstract

A model of endogenous growth is presented, based on productive public expenditures, and featuring some degree of income inequality, and polarization in policy preferences. The main innovation lays in the political process determining capital taxation that relies, both on voting and on "influence activities," exploited by the capitalist elite in order to capture some political power at the expenses of the median voter. In particular, investments in lobbying activities allow the rich to obtain lower capital taxes, to the benefit of both themselves and economic growth. The model's equilibrium dynamics features variable taxes and lobbying. In addition, it is established the existence of a transitional dynamics featuring convergence to a balanced growth path, characterized by constant taxes and lobbying (and a constant growth rate of consumption and capital). Capital accumulation leads, along the transitional path, to more and more lobbying, that asymptotically cause taxation to reach precisely the tax rate preferred by the capitalists (induced by a very large political pressure on the government). Specifically, the (unique) balanced growth equilibrium features the maximization of the net interest rate, as well as the economy's growth rate and capitalists' welfare. On the transitional path, lobbying reduces the workers' political weight (and their consumption), and therefore makes fiscal policy relatively more and more capitalists friendly. Policy polarization (loosely speaking reflecting inequality) has somewhat interesting effects along the transitional path towards balanced growth. Hereby, actual taxes become more capitalists-friendly relatively to the Meltzer and Richard's (1981) canonical median voter tax benchmark, mutatis mutandis. In the end, full convergence is established, from a pure democracy ruled through the de jure power only, to a political economic realm totally de facto dominated by the few capitalists, i.e. to an "oligarchic technocracy," possibly ruled by the "top 1%" of the population.

Suggested Citation

  • Vindigni, Andrea, 2024. "Factor Shares, Redistribution and Growth in a Captured Democracy," IZA Discussion Papers 16723, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16723
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-1037, October.
    2. Robert J. Barro, 1998. "Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522543, December.
    3. Paul, Gilles Saint & Verdier, Thierry, 1996. "Inequality, redistribution and growth: A challenge to the conventional political economy approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 719-728, April.
    4. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Special Interest Politics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262571676, December.
    5. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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    JEL classification:

    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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