Choosing hybrid organizations for local servicesdelivery: An empirical analysis of partial privatization
The empirical literature about factors explaining local government delivery choices has traditionally focused the attention on the public or private production dilemma. However, hybrid organizational forms such as mixed public-private firms are increasingly used in several European countries. This paper makes use of survey data from Spanish municipalities to examine motivations of local governments for engaging in hybrid organizational forms. Data refer to two very relevant local services: water distribution and solid waste collection. The empirical analysis indicates that the use of mixed firms emerge as a type of pragmatically based ‘third way’ between pure public and pure private production. Indeed, local governments make use of mixed firms when cost considerations (scale economies, transaction costs and so on), financial constraints and private interests exert contradictory pressures. On the contrary, political and ideological factors do not play any significant role on the local government decision of engaging or not in joint ventures with private partners.
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|Date of revision:||Apr 2008|
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