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Imf Conditionality and Program Ownership: A Case for Streamlined Conditionality

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  • Mr. S. Nuri Erbas

Abstract

Program conditionality and ownership are important considerations in the IMF's current rethinking of program design. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a theory of program conditionality and ownership on the basis of Cumulative Prospect Theory. The policymaker may value a set of programs, each with fewer conditions, more than an extended program with as many conditions. This valuation bias is greater in ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) than under uncertainty. If greater valuation of a program engenders more explicit and implicit ownership, then programs with fewer conditions may have a better chance of success. Less is more.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. S. Nuri Erbas, 2003. "Imf Conditionality and Program Ownership: A Case for Streamlined Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 2003/098, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2003/098
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Leeson & Christopher Coyne, 2007. "The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 237-250, June.
    2. Ostry, Jonathan D. & Jeanne, Olivier & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2008. "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," CEPR Discussion Papers 7022, Centre for Economic Policy Research.

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