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Determinants of Subordinated Debt Issuance by Japanese Regional Banks


  • Naohiko Baba

    (Senior Economist and Director, Financial Markets Department, Bank of Japan. (E-mail:

  • Masakazu Inada

    (Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan. (E-mail:

  • Yasuo Maeda

    (Professor, Faculty of Economics, Keio University . (E-mail:


This paper empirically investigates the determinants of subordinated debt issuance by Japanese regional banks during the period 2000-2005 using a probit model. The empirical results suggest the following: (i) Throughout the period, Japanese regional banks with a lower capital/asset ratio have a higher incentive to issue subordinated debts because they are counted as Tier 2 capital under the Basel Accord. (ii) During the period of instability in the Japanese banking system ( 2000-2003), investors tended to intensively use financial variables such as the non-performing loan ratio, ROA, and total deposits outstanding to screen good banks for their investments in the subordinated debts. (iii) During the period after the banking system regained stability (2004-2005), investors tended to pay less attention to the above variables due mainly to the mitigated default risk of these banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Naohiko Baba & Masakazu Inada & Yasuo Maeda, 2007. "Determinants of Subordinated Debt Issuance by Japanese Regional Banks," IMES Discussion Paper Series 07-E-03, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  • Handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:07-e-03

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Gorton, Gary & Santomero, Anthony M, 1990. "Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 119-128, February.
    2. Urs W. Birchler & Diana Hancock, 2003. "What does the yield on subordinated bank debt measure?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-19, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Daniel M. Covitz & Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, 2004. "Market discipline in banking reconsidered: the roles of funding manager decisions and deposit insurance reform," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-53, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. Covitz, Daniel M. & Harrison, Paul, 2004. "Do banks time bond issuance to trigger disclosure, due diligence, and investor scrutiny?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 299-323, July.
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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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