IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Disuasión de Entrada Vía Subastas: Free Riding o Colusión?

Listed author(s):
Registered author(s):

    Este trabajo analiza la ocurrencia de disuasión de entrada, y la posibilidad de colusión entre las firmas incumbentes para lograr tal fin, en la serie de subastas anuales de derechos de pesca para Bacalao de profundidad (Dissostichus Eleginoides), ocurridas en Chile a partir de inicios de los 1990s. En dos de las subastas consideradas se observó intento de entrada, infructuoso en ambos casos, por parte de un nuevo entrante. Se analiza la posibilidad que las firmas ya establecidas hayan usado estrategias no coordinadas de disuasión de entrada, o bien se hayan coludido para lograr dicho objetivo. Para ello se desarrolla un modelo de competencia en dos etapas, distinguiendo entre rivales incumbentes y potenciales entrantes. En la primera etapa se adquieren derechos de pesca vía subasta tipo inglesa, los que en una segunda etapa permiten competir en un mercado Cournot. Se modela la venta secuencial de múltiples derechos de pesca considerando información perfecta entre los participantes en cada subasta. La posible entrada de un nuevo rival se analiza en función del número de rivales ya establecidos, los costos de entrada, las toneladas de pesca en cada derecho subastado y el número de derechos en venta.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv215.

    in new window

    Length: 50 pages
    Date of creation: Dec 2008
    Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv215
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Erasmo Escala 1835, 6500620 Santiago

    Phone: (562) 692-0265
    Fax: (562) 692-0303
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Email:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    in new window

    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. Chen, Yongmin, 2000. "Strategic Bidding by Potential Competitors: Will Monopoly Persist?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 161-175, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marcela Perticara)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.