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Disuasión de Entrada Vía Subastas: Free Riding o Colusión?

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Abstract

Este trabajo analiza la ocurrencia de disuasión de entrada, y la posibilidad de colusión entre las firmas incumbentes para lograr tal fin, en la serie de subastas anuales de derechos de pesca para Bacalao de profundidad (Dissostichus Eleginoides), ocurridas en Chile a partir de inicios de los 1990s. En dos de las subastas consideradas se observó intento de entrada, infructuoso en ambos casos, por parte de un nuevo entrante. Se analiza la posibilidad que las firmas ya establecidas hayan usado estrategias no coordinadas de disuasión de entrada, o bien se hayan coludido para lograr dicho objetivo. Para ello se desarrolla un modelo de competencia en dos etapas, distinguiendo entre rivales incumbentes y potenciales entrantes. En la primera etapa se adquieren derechos de pesca vía subasta tipo inglesa, los que en una segunda etapa permiten competir en un mercado Cournot. Se modela la venta secuencial de múltiples derechos de pesca considerando información perfecta entre los participantes en cada subasta. La posible entrada de un nuevo rival se analiza en función del número de rivales ya establecidos, los costos de entrada, las toneladas de pesca en cada derecho subastado y el número de derechos en venta.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio Peña Torres & Gabriel Fernández Aguirre, 2008. "Disuasión de Entrada Vía Subastas: Free Riding o Colusión?," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv215, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv215
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. Chen, Yongmin, 2000. "Strategic Bidding by Potential Competitors: Will Monopoly Persist?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 161-175, June.
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    Keywords

    Colusión; Disuasión de entrada; Subastas Repetidas; Free Riding.;

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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