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Individual Trandsferable Fishing Quotas in Chile: Recent History and Current Debates

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    Artisanal and industrial fishing sectors in Chile require the consolidation of fishery management schemes that promote the rationalization of fishing efforts, adjusting them to scarcer fish stocks. We argue that a system based on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) is the best available option, especially for the industrial sector. Individual assignments favor the coordination of collective solutions to rationalizing fishing efforts, while transferability promotes economically efficient solutions to the excessive fishing capacity problem. We propose an initial assignment of ITQs based on historical presence, conditioning the ITQ user-rights to annual payments that allow financing of the ITQs' management and enforcement costs. We defend an initial assignment of ITQs as transitory user-rights, with a reasonably long period of validity (15-20 years). We argue that this favors the political viability of being able to continue perfecting the ITQs system in the future. We also propose to empower Artisanal Fishermen Associations, which be able to provide reliable proofs of having relevant local representation, with faculties for deciding on and administering the distribution and use (among their members) of the total quota assigned to them by the fisheries regulator. These self-governing faculties would include the possibility of allowing for transferability of individual quota allocations. Finally, we propose that artisanal fishermen have the legal ability to carry out transactions with industrial interests, so that some proportion of the industrial quota could be caught inside the first five miles (currently being a reserved zone for artisanal fishing), for example using artisanal vessels for these purposes.

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    Paper provided by Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines in its series ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers with number inv139.

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    Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv139
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    1. Julio Peñ-Torres, 1999. "Harvesting Preemption, Industrial Concentration and Enclosure of National Marine Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(4), pages 545-571, December.
    2. Hatcher, A., 1996. "Devolved management of fish quotas in the United Kingdom: producers' organizations and individual quota systems," Discussion Papers 97., Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources.
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