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Buy American: Bad for Jobs, Worse for Reputation

Author

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  • Gary Clyde Hufbauer

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

  • Jeffrey J. Schott

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

On January 28, 2009, the US House of Representatives passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. Out of the bill's 700 text pages, a small half-page section attracted enormous media attention: the section requiring that all public projects funded by the stimulus plan must use only iron and steel produced in the United States. The US Senate draft includes a broad Buy American provision that goes further than the House bill, expanding the requirement to all manufacturing products. Based on economic and legal analysis, the authors conclude that the Buy American provisions would violate US trade obligations and damage the United States' reputation, with very little impact on US jobs. They estimate that the additional US steel production fostered by the Buy American provisions will amount to around 0.5 million metric tons. This in turn translates into a gain in steel industry employment equal to roughly 1,000 jobs. The job impact is small because steel is very capital intensive. In the giant US economy, with a labor force of roughly 140 million people, 1,000 jobs more or less is a rounding error. On balance the Buy American provisions could well cost jobs if other countries emulate US policies or retaliate against them. Most importantly, the Buy American provisions contradict the G-20 commitment not to implement new protectionist measures--a commitment that was designed to forestall a rush of "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies. Gary Clyde Hufbauer in a BBC interview, February 3, 2009. © BBC. Posted with permission of the BBC. What should be done? The best result would be to simply delete the Buy American provision in the House-Senate conference. Next best would be to keep the House version, applying the Buy American restriction only to iron and steel, but stating explicitly--in either the statutory text or in the legislative history--that the public interest waiver is intended to be used to avoid violations of US trade obligations. The third option is a presidential statement--preferably before legislation is finalized--that the United States will respect its international obligations when it applies the Buy American provisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, 2009. "Buy American: Bad for Jobs, Worse for Reputation," Policy Briefs PB09-2, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb09-2
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    1. repec:wsr:pbrief:y:2015:i:026 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Peter B. Dixon & Maureen T. Rimmer & Robert G. Waschik, 2017. "Macro, industry and regional effects of eliminating Buy America(n) programs: USAGE simulations," Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre Working Papers g-271, Victoria University, Centre of Policy Studies/IMPACT Centre.
    3. Bouët, Antoine & Laborde Debucquet, David, 2017. "Assessing the potential cost of a failed Doha Round:," IFPRI book chapters, in: Bouët, Antoine & Laborde Debucquet, David (ed.), Agriculture, development, and the global trading system: 2000– 2015, chapter 6, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    4. Bouet, Antoine & Laborde, David, 2008. "The potential cost of a failed Doha Round," Issue briefs 56, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    5. Mario Larch & Wolfgang Lechthaler, 2011. "Why `Buy American' is a bad idea but politicians still like it," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(3), pages 838-858, August.
    6. Miroslav N. Jovanovic, 2011. "Globalisation: An Anatomy," Chapters, in: Miroslav N. Jovanović (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Integration, Volume I, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Jeffrey J. Schott & Cathleen Cimino, 2013. "Crafting a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: What Can Be Done," Policy Briefs PB13-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    8. Bouet, Antoine & Laborde, David, 2008. "The potential cost of a failed Doha Round:," Issue briefs 56, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    9. Naude, Wim, 2009. "The Global Economic Crisis after One Year: Is a New Paradigm for Recovery in Developing Countries Emerging?," WIDER Working Papers UNU-WIDER UNU Policy Brie, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Antoine Bouet, 2010. "Assessing the potential cost of a failed Doha round," Larefi Working Papers 201001, Larefi, Université Bordeaux 4.
    11. Wim Naudé, 2009. "Fallacies about the Global Financial Crisis Harms Recovery in the Poorest Countries," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 10(4), pages 3-12, January.
    12. Lechthaler, Wolfgang, 2009. "Why trade barriers hurt: Protectionism in the new trade model," Kiel Policy Brief 5, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    13. Wim Naudé, 2011. "The Global Financial Crisis and Development: Implications for the Entrepreneurial Economy," Working Papers 2011/01, Maastricht School of Management.
    14. Claude BARFIELD, 2009. "Politics of Trade in the USA and in the Obama Administration: Implications for Asian Regionalism," Asian Economic Policy Review, Japan Center for Economic Research, vol. 4(2), pages 227-243, December.
    15. Claire Brunel & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, 2009. "Money for the Auto Industry: Consistent with WTO Rules?," Policy Briefs PB09-4, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    16. Hong, T., 2021. "Revisiting the Trade Policy Uncertainty Index," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2174, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

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