Informational Disadvantage and Bargaining Power
We consider an alternating offer model where the size of the total surplus is stochastic. Furthermore, the size changes during the time when the offer is being considered. As a result the responder may obtain more information than the proposer. We analyze how the asymmetry in ability to access good information affects the bargaining power, both in terms of the resulting share and in terms of the delay in agreement.
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- Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Option Values and Bargaining Delays," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 139-153, September.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
- Ben-Ner, Avner & Jun, Byoung, 1996. "Employee Buyout in a Bargaining Game with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 502-23, June.
- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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