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International Trade with Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach

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  • Martimort, David
  • Verdier, Thierry

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  • Martimort, David & Verdier, Thierry, 2009. "International Trade with Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach," IDEI Working Papers 223, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:562
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Xavier Gabaix & Jean‐Michel Lasry & Pierre‐Louis Lions & Benjamin Moll, 2016. "The Dynamics of Inequality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 2071-2111, November.
    2. Roger Guesnerie, 1998. "Peut-on toujours redistribuer les gains à la spécialisation et à l'échange ? Un retour en pointillé sur Ricardo et Heckscher-Ohlin," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 555-579.
    3. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    4. Roger Guesnerie, 2001. "Second Best Redistributive Policies: The Case Of International Trade," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 15-25, January.
    5. Spector, David, 2001. "Is it possible to redistribute the gains from trade using income taxation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 441-460, December.
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
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