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Asymmetric Decentralization and Inequality

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  • Pablo Beramendi
  • Melissa Rogers

Abstract

This paper examines how spatial inequalities interact with asymmetric decentralization to shape redistributive effort and distributional outcomes. Using cross-national evidence on top income and wealth shares, progressive tax structures, and measures of asymmetric regional authority and legislative malapportionment, the authors find: (i) higher spatial inequality is associated with greater concentration at the top of the income and wealth distributions; (ii) asymmetric regional authority is, on average, linked to lower inequality and higher progressive tax shares, though its egalitarian association weakens as spatial inequality rises; and (iii) legislative malapportionment correlates with higher inequality and lower progressive taxation and typically amplifies the inequality-raising role of spatial disparities. The results highlight that institutional asymmetries condition the capacity and willingness of states to tax and redistribute under pronounced territorial disparities.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Beramendi & Melissa Rogers, 2026. "Asymmetric Decentralization and Inequality," IDEAGOV Working Papers WP2609, IDEAGOV - International Center for Decentralization and Governance.
    • Handle: RePEc:ida:wpaper:wp2609
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October.
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