The logic of forbidden colours
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to clarify Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thesis that colours possess logical structures, focusing on his ‘puzzle proposition’ that “there can be a bluish green but not a reddish green”, (2) to compare model-theoretical and game-theoretical approaches to the colour exclusion problem. What is gained, then, is a new game-theoretical framework for the logic of ‘forbidden’ (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colours. My larger aim is to discuss phenomenological principles of the demarcation of the bounds of logic as formal ontology of abstract objects
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Publication status:||Published in WP BRP Series: Humanities / HUM, December 2012, pages 1-19|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Myasnitskaya 20, Moscow 101000|
Web page: http://www.hse.ru/
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