Do voters vote in line with their policy preferences? The role of information
This paper investigates how information a ects voting behavior. Speci cally, I test (i) if more informed voters are better at voting for their most preferred politicians and (ii) if this translates into a bias on the aggregate level. To do so, I use a set of Swedish individual survey data on the preferences for public spending of both politicians and voters, which provides an opportunity to investigate how information affects voters' ability to match their preferences with those of the politicians. The results support both hypotheses: more informed voters are more likely to vote for their most preferred politicians, and on the aggregate level, I find that the left-wing parties would have received 1 to 3 percentage points fewer votes if all voters had been fully informed.
|Date of creation:||21 Dec 2010|
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- Per Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008. "Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 1037-1056, 09.
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