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Optimal income taxation without tax evasion

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Abstract

This paper is the first to integrate corruption with respect to tax collection in a Mirrleesian model of optimal redistributive taxation. The analysis starts with a simple two-type model, showing that the optimal marginal tax structure resembles that of the original Stiglitz (1982) model, albeit for different reasons. We also extend the analysis to a framework with many types and present policy rules for marginal taxation over the whole ability distribution. The marginal income tax rates are all non-negative and can be expressed in terms of two key determinants: the distributional weights attached to taxpayers, and how the private cost to evade taxes varies with the taxpayers’ income. Finally, we consider the role of government expenditures directly targeting the incentives of the tax collector, such that these public expenditures and the optimal tax structure are implemented simultaneously.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Xu, Fei, 2023. "Optimal income taxation without tax evasion," Umeå Economic Studies 1020, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 24 Oct 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:1020
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    1. Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-373, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Redistribution; taxation; corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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