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Quantitative easing, global economic crisis and market response

Author

Listed:
  • Hausken, Kjell

    (UiS)

  • Ncube, Mthuli

Abstract

We develop a game theoretic model for the central banks profit and the markets profit dependent on quantitative easing (QE) or no quantitative easing (no QE), where the market responds by lowering interest rates, keeping interest rates unchanged, or raising interest rates. The model is compared with empirical data. We classify 69 QE events and 69 no QE counterfactuals for four central banks, i.e. 17 events for the Federal Reserve, 9 events for Bank of England, 32 events for Bank of Japan, and 11 events for the European Central Bank. The market response to the BoJ and ECB QE is almost exclusively to keep interest rates unchanged. Although this response is most common to the Federal Reserve QE (9 events), the market frequently responds as the Federal Reserve prefers, by lowering interest rates (7 events). For BoE the market response is evenly split across the three outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hausken, Kjell & Ncube, Mthuli, 2013. "Quantitative easing, global economic crisis and market response," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2013/4, University of Stavanger.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:stavef:2013_004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baumeister, Christiane & Benati, Luca, 2010. "Unconventional monetary policy and the great recession - Estimating the impact of a compression in the yield spread at the zero lower bound," Working Paper Series 1258, European Central Bank.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
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    Cited by:

    1. Monica Hernandez, 2023. "An Unintended Consequence of Uncoordinated International Monetary Policy on Central America," International Journal of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(1), pages 88-103, January.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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