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Climate agreements: emission quotas versus technology policies

  • Golombek, Rolf

    ()

    (The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Hoel, Michael

    ()

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

The Kyoto Agreement is the result of international negotiations over many years. However, because of a number of weaknesses, different sorts of climate agreement have been suggested: for example, coordinated R&D activities that reduce abatement costs for all firms. We will compare an agreement focusing only on emissions (a Kyoto type of agreement) with an agreement focusing only on technology, assuming that the costs of abatement are affected by R&D in all firms through technology spillovers. In an emissions agreement, emissions should be restricted to the extent that the carbon price exceeds the Pigovian level. For sufficiently low technology spillovers, an emissions agreement is more efficient than a technology agreement specifying an R&D subsidy to be imposed on all firms in all countries. The opposite may hold if technology spillovers are sufficiently large. Finally, an alternative technology agreement specifying R&D expenditure in each country is more efficient than an agreement specifying an R&D subsidy.

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File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2006/Memo-21-2006.pdf
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 21/2006.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 29 Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2006_021
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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  1. Golombek, Rolf & Hagem, Cathrine & Hoel, Michael, 1995. "Efficient incomplete international climate agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 25-46, May.
  2. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol," Working Papers 2006_12Classification-JEL, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  3. Cohen, Wesley M & Levinthal, Daniel A, 1989. "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 569-96, September.
  4. Spence, Michael, 1984. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-21, January.
  5. Hoel, M., 1993. "Efficient Climate Policy in the Presence of Free Riders," Memorandum 04/1993, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  6. David G. Victor & Lesley A. Coben, 2005. "A Herd Mentality in the Design of International Environmental Agreements?," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 5(1), pages 24-57, 02.
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