The Multi-item Bisection Auction
This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items with unit-demand agents. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva Et. al, 2007) to the environment with multiple heterogeneous items. We show that it elicits a minimal amount of information on preferences required to find the Vickrey-Clark-Groves outcome (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961), when there are two items for sale and an arbitrary number of agents.
|Date of creation:||07 Oct 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published as Erlanson, Albin, 'The Dou-Item Bisection Auction' in Computational Economics, 2014, pages 15-31.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden|
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Debasis Mishra & David C. Parkes, 2007.
"Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions,"
Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers
07-04, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Gabrielle Demange & Gale David & Marilda Sotomayor, 1986.
- Grigorieva,Elena & Herings,P. Jean-Jacques & Müller,Rudolf & Vermeulen,Dries, 2002.
"The private value single item bisection auction,"
051, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
- Tommy Andersson & Christer Andersson, 2012. "Properties of the DGS-Auction Algorithm," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 39(2), pages 113-133, February.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. & Kahn, C.M., 1990.
"Protecting the Wnner: Second-price Versus Oral Auctions,"
University of Chicago - Economics Research Center
90-8, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Kahn, Charles M., 1991. "Protecting the winner : Second-price versus oral auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 243-248, March.
- Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
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