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Controlling Versus Enabling

Author

Listed:
  • Andrei Hagiu

    (Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit)

  • Julian Wright

    (National University of Singapore)

Abstract

Revenue sharing between principals and agents is commonly used to balance double-sided moral hazard. We provide a theory of how, when such revenue-sharing is optimal, a principal allocates control rights over decisions that either party could make. We show that the principal either keeps control over all such decisions, or gives up control entirely, and that this choice is aligned with whether the principal chooses to keep more or less than 50% of variable revenues. We explore how moral hazard, contractibility, and spillovers affect this choice. The theory helps explain whether professionals operate as employees or as independent contractors.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, 2015. "Controlling Versus Enabling," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-002, Harvard Business School, revised Jul 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-002
    as

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    File URL: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/pages/download.aspx?name=16-002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. David S. Evans & Andrei Hagiu & Richard Schmalensee, 2008. "Invisible Engines: How Software Platforms Drive Innovation and Transform Industries," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550687, April.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    4. Marc Rysman, 2009. "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 125-143, Summer.
    5. Richard E. Romano, 1994. "Double Moral Hazard and Resale Price Maintenance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(3), pages 455-466, Autumn.
    6. Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, 2007. "Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 1-34, March.
    7. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    9. Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, 2015. "Marketplace or Reseller?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 184-203, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mark J. Tremblay, 2016. "Vertical Relationships within Platform Marketplaces," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-11, July.
    2. Moshe A. Barach & Joseph M. Golden & John J. Horton, 2020. "Steering in Online Markets: The Role of Platform Incentives and Credibility," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(9), pages 4047-4070, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    control rights; decision authority; employment; independent contractors; organizational theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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