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When and How to Subsidize Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts?

  • Andras Simonovits

    ()

    (Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Department of Economics - CEU, Mathematical Institute - Budapest University of Technology)

When and how to subsidize tax-favored pension accounts? To defend myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a mandatory system but to help savers, it adds taxfavored retirement accounts. If the mandatory system is progressive, then a proportional voluntary system can beneficially dampen the redistribution. If the mandatory system is proportional, then a progressive voluntary system may raise the old-age consumption of the lower-paid. But if both the mandatory and the voluntary systems are proportional and the ceiling is high (as is the case in Hungary), then the latter does not diminish the tension of the mandatory system.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 0902.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0902
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  1. James Sefton & Justin vandeVen & Martin Weale, 2008. "Means Testing Retirement Benefits: fostering equity or discouraging savings?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 556-590, 04.
  2. James M. Poterba & Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, 1996. "How Retirement Saving Programs Increase Saving," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 91-112, Fall.
  3. R. Glenn Hubbard & Jonathan S. Skinner, 1996. "Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving Incentives," NBER Working Papers 5686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, 2002. "For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior," JCPR Working Papers 256, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  5. R. Glenn Hubbard & Jonathan S. Skinner, 1996. "Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving Incentives," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 53540, 5.
  6. Bernheim, B. Douglas, 2002. "Taxation and saving," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 18, pages 1173-1249 Elsevier.
  7. Feldstein, Martin S, 1987. "Should Social Security Benefits Be Means Tested?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 468-84, June.
  8. Börsch-Supan, Axel & Reil-Held, Anette & Schunk, Daniel, 2008. "Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(03), pages 295-319, November.
  9. Richard Disney, 2004. "Are contributions to public pension programmes a tax on employment?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(39), pages 267-311, 07.
  10. Tonin, Mirco, 2011. "Minimum wage and tax evasion: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1635-1651.
  11. Diamond, Peter & Koszegi, Botond, 2003. "Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1839-1872, September.
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