IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/halshs-01962197.html

On Information Aggregation in International Alliances

Author

Listed:
  • Raghul S Venkatesh

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

I develop a model of strategic communication to study information aggregation in an alliance between multiple players. An alliance exhibits four features: i) imperfect private information among players; ii) substitutability in actions; iii) constraints on the action set; and iv) preference heterogeneity (biases). The main result of the paper derives conditions for full information aggregation within the alliance under a public communication protocol. Full information aggregation ensues as long as players' biases are sufficiently cohesive with respect to the constraints on the action set. When players can (costlessly) choose an action set ex ante, I derive the precise conditions on the minimal action set such that there is full information aggregation. Comparative statics uncovers two sources for the differences in the size of the minimal action set between players: bias over outcomes (preference effect) and degree of interdependency (interdependency effect). The results are discussed in the context of burden sharing incentives during military interventions within NATO.

Suggested Citation

  • Raghul S Venkatesh, 2019. "On Information Aggregation in International Alliances," Working Papers halshs-01962197, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01962197
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01962197v2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01962197v2/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Galeotti, Andrea & Ghiglino, Christian & Squintani, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic information transmission networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1751-1769.
    2. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler, 2010. "Strategic Communication Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(3), pages 1072-1099.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lai, Ernest K., 2014. "Expert advice for amateurs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-16.
    2. Chand, A.K.S. & Currarini, Sergio & Ursino, Giovanni, 2013. "Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 158726, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    3. Li, Zhuozheng & Rantakari, Heikki & Yang, Huanxing, 2016. "Competitive cheap talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 65-89.
    4. Foerster, Manuel, 2019. "Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
    5. Manuel Foerster, 2023. "Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1291-1316, December.
    6. Manuel Foerster & Joel (J.J.) van der Weele, 2018. "Denial and Alarmism in Collective Action Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-019/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Kailin Chen, 2025. "Communication as Voting," Papers 2505.14639, arXiv.org, revised May 2026.
    8. Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2015. "A model of belief influence in large social networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(1), pages 21-59, May.
    9. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    10. Rong, Rong & Houser, Daniel & Dai, Anovia Yifan, 2016. "Money or friends: Social identity and deception in networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 56-66.
    11. Migrow, Dimitri, 2018. "Designing Communication Hierarchies," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 44, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    12. Migrow, Dimitri, 2021. "Designing communication hierarchies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    13. Jeanne Hagenbach & Frédéric Koessler & Eduardo Perez‐Richet, 2014. "Certifiable Pre‐Play Communication: Full Disclosure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(3), pages 1093-1131, May.
    14. Syngjoo Choi & Jihong Lee, 2014. "Communication, Coordination, And Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 223-247, February.
    15. Raghul S Venkatesh, 2018. "On Information Aggregation in International Alliances," AMSE Working Papers 1855, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jul 2019.
    16. Tabasso, Nicole, 2019. "Diffusion of multiple information: On information resilience and the power of segregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 219-240.
    17. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01053478 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Mohamed Belhaj & Frédéric Deroïan & Mathieu Faure, 2022. "Do people share opportunities?," Working Papers hal-03921232, HAL.
    19. Garcia, Daniel, 2012. "Communication and Information Acquisition in Networks," MPRA Paper 55481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2014.
    20. Leister, C. Matthew, 2020. "Information acquisition and welfare in network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 453-475.
    21. de Martí, Joan & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Network games with incomplete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 221-240.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01962197. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.