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Terrorisme à grande échelle : partage de risques et politiques publiques

  • Erwann Michel-Kerjan

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS - Polytechnique - X)

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United-States had a deep impact on both insurance/reinsurance industry world wide -as the most costly event ever- and governmental responsibilities. Because of its very specific configuration, such a tragedy made of terrorism a new source of large-scale extreme risks. From then on, and from catastrophic risk coverage's perspective, terrorism has been often compared with other extreme events like natural disasters. We show in this article that terrorism presents, however, several characteristics that limit its insurability by the maket and is actually much more complex to be managed than the natural hazards, even being catastrophic: Negative externalities of auto-protection; Dynamic uncertainty associated with the risk; Specific distribution of information on risk ; Government decisions influencing the risk of terrorism. Taking into account those singularities, the market reactions to 9/11 and considering the role of governments, several key questions arise: Who should pay for the consequences of terrorist attacks? How financing such events? Can one establish ex ante some national mechanisms of extreme risk sharing that would be based upon a necessary public-private partnership? We also discuss the provisory terrorism risk coverage schemes established in 2002 in France and the United States. This article, which is based on the most recent developments on that issue, suggests some elements for response; it presents an analysis in a field of research that has been relatively underdealt with by the French economic literature.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00242918.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242918
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  1. Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Beverly Porter, 2003. "Assessing, Managing, and Financing Extreme Events: Dealing with Terrorism," NBER Working Papers 10179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Anne Gron, 1994. "Capacity Constraints and Cycles in Property-Casualty Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 110-127, Spring.
  3. Froot, Kenneth A., 2001. "The market for catastrophe risk: a clinical examination," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 529-571, May.
  4. Doherty, Neil A & Garven, James R, 1995. "Insurance Cycles: Interest Rates and the Capacity Constraint Model," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 383-404, July.
  5. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Burkhard Pedell, 2005. "Terrorism Risk Coverage in the Post-9/11 Era: A Comparison of New Public–Private Partnerships in France, Germany and the U.S.*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 30(1), pages 144-170, January.
  6. Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2003. "New Challenges in Critical Infrastructures : A US Perspective," Working Papers hal-00242947, HAL.
  7. Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Patrick Lagadec, 2004. "Meeting the Challenge of Interdependent Critical Networks under Threat : The Paris Initiative," Working Papers hal-00242926, HAL.
  8. Nathalie De Marcelis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2003. "Catastrophe risk sharing and public-private partnerships : From natural disasters to terrorism," Working Papers hal-00242981, HAL.
  9. Doherty, Neil A & Posey, Lisa Lipowski, 1997. "Availability Crises in Insurance Markets: Optimal Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Capacity Constraints," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 55-80, October.
  10. Kunreuther, Howard & Heal, Geoffrey, 2003. " Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 231-49, March-May.
  11. Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 1996. "Catastrophe Insurance, Capital Markets and Uninsurable Risks," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-12, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  12. Doherty, Neil A & Lamm-Tennant, Joan & Starks, Laura T, 2003. " Insuring September 11th: Market Recovery and Transparency," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 179-99, March-May.
  13. J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty & Anita Lo, 1999. "Can Insurers Pay for the "Big One"? Measuring the Capacity of an Insurance Market to Respond to Catastrophic Losses," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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