L'Impact De La Structure Financiere Sur Les Decisions Strategiques : Le Cas Du Negoce De Vin Bourguignon
Nous montrons au travers du cas du négoce de vin bourguignon que l'influence de la structure financière sur les décisions (théorie financière moderne) repose implicitement sur des mesures de la performance. Si ces mesures sont inadaptées, les effets positifs attendus sont annulés. Cela nous conduit à poser la question de l'utilisation des outils de pilotage internes dans les relations avec les apporteurs de capitaux.
|Date of creation:||May 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in 21ÈME CONGRES DE L'AFC, May 2000, France. pp.CD-Rom, 2000|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00587511|
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